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Chinese Views of the Military Balance in the Western Pacific
Eric Heginbotham

Summary
This report examines Chinese views about the military balance of power between China and the
United States in the Western Pacific. It argues that while there is no single “Chinese” view on this
topic, Chinese analysts tend to agree that 1) the gap between the two militaries has narrowed
significantly in recent years, 2) the Chinese military still lags in important ways, and 3) Chinese
military inferiority vis-à-vis the U.S. increases the further away it operates from the Mainland. In
terms of specific areas of relative strength, the Chinese military has shown the greatest improvements
in military hardware, but has farther to go in the area of jointness, training, and other military
“software.” Nevertheless, despite continued criticism from senior civilian leaders, training quality
has likely improved due to a greater focus on realism, and recent military reforms have, to a degree,
improved the prospects for jointness.
Introduction
There is no single Chinese view of the military balance. As in the United States, there are many
perspectives, informed by personal biases and access to different source material. Conclusions also
differ depending on the specific circumstances of each scenario—the adversary, geography, warning
time, casus belli, and early crisis decision making. To the extent that it is possible to generalize, the
range of Chinese assessments do not, in aggregate, appear to dramatically differ from professional or
informed analyses by Western experts. The Chinese leadership recognizes both the remarkable
strides that have been made in modernizing the Chinese military, as well as important continuing
weaknesses. Chinese analysts agree with American counterparts that Chinese capabilities are far
more formidable immediately offshore than they are in more distant locations.
To an extent, the reason for broad consensus across the Pacific lies in the exchange of ideas between
Western and Chinese analysts. Chinese views may be a function of ready access to translated
Western analyses, which in turn rely heavily on anecdotes and analyses found in published Chinese
sources.
To say that there is general agreement on the balance of power does not imply a complete agreement
or identity between Chinese and U.S. views. Systematic biases may affect the assessments of each
state, as well as different groups within them. High levels of U.S. operational proficiency, a product
of sophisticated training structures and regimes developed after the Vietnam War, may alert some
U.S. analysts to factors that may not be considered by Chinese counterparts. Only recently, for
example, has “jointness” become a guiding criterion in Chinese military decision making. Similarly,
as PLA modernization contributes to an improved understanding of modern war, the analysis of
military balance issues has expanded to include greater consideration of dynamic factors in combat.
Improved assessment may, in turn, contribute to a more circumspect (i.e., pessimistic) assessment of
the balance even as it increases Chinese prospects for overcoming challenges.
This report comprises five main parts. The first section outlines the types of source materials that
reflect Chinese views, and the second touches on analytic methods behind Chinese assessments. The
third section assesses how Chinese leaders and analysts view the overall balance of power today and
its evolution over the last two decades. The fourth section discusses particular areas of perceived
strength and weakness in PLA capabilities relative to those of the United States. The fifth section
examines how Chinese analysts view the potential future impact of intensified competition with the
United States and the latter’s increasingly sharp focus on competition with China. The report
concludes with a summary of findings.

Source Materials
What types of Chinese source materials discuss perceptions of the balance of power in the Western
Pacific, and what methodologies lie behind the assessments?
White Papers and Institutional Reports
A variety of institutionally-produced white papers and reports provide the most accessible—if very
general—overview assessments of China’s relative military position. Among the more important
public documents that touch on the balance of power, broadly conceived, are the Science of Military
Strategy (both the 2013 Academy of Military Science version and the 2015 National Defense
University version) and defense white papers, the most recent of which, published in July 2019, is
China’s National Defense in the New Era, published by the State Council Information Office and
written primarily by military academics.
Senior Leader Statements
During major political or government events (e.g., major Communist Party Congress or National
People’s Congress meetings) Chinese political leaders periodically summarize the current state and
future goals of the Chinese military, with at least implicit comparisons to other major powers—
especially the United States. Military leaders may make similar statements during important military
gatherings, though these are likely to echo statements by Party leaders. Leadership statements may
sometimes be as much hortatory as they are analytic, but they nevertheless represent the official view
that others are expected to adopt.
Journal Articles and Books by Civilian and Military Academics
Civilian and military academics, working at universities and think tanks, may produce some of the
broadest assessments of the balance of power, as well as a variety of other work that bears on the
balance of power. Some of the small number of civilian academics working on strategic issues have
ties with the military and conduct research solicited by the government, as well as unsolicited work
that is forwarded through government channels.1 Most also have deep relationships with foreign
scholars and are well-versed in the Western international relations and security studies literature.
Military academics, some of whom have a hand in producing white papers and other institutional
products, also publish single-author works in military and civilian journals or books. Both military
and civilian academics, particularly the latter, are somewhat freer to express views about the balance
of power in particular scenarios in single author works than they might be when producing
institutionally edited reports.
Media Reporting
Media reporting provides the most voluminous record. This material is characterized by extreme
variance in terms of quality, degree of authority, and perspective. The media’s reporting on military
and security issues often focuses on individual events or developments, such as the deployment of
new weapons or conduct of recent exercises, rather than on broad-based trends. The worst military
news, such as the repeated failure of the Chinese aircraft engine industry to deliver a production
model of the WS-15 engine for the J-20 aircraft, is seldom mentioned. Nevertheless, a host of topics
are covered, some with considerable nuance. Moreover, the Chinese media disseminates contrarian

1

The National Social Science Foundation (国家社会科学基金), for example, offers awards for research. In 2018 alone,
the foundation made almost 5,000 research awards, dozens of which were on military or security themes. 国家社科基金：
项目数据库 (National Social Science Foundation: Program Data Base) http://fz.people.com.cn/skygb/sk/, accessed April
28, 2019. Academics may also write neican (short, formal internal memoranda), solicited and circulated by the CCP
Central Committee, General Office, and yaogao (less structured “important reports” that may be forwarded by work units).
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views by reporting on news stories and other sources published in the West, and many media
websites host forums or blogs focusing on military issues.
Creating a Mosaic in Grayscale
Every one of the sources listed above could be parsed more finely, with various sub-categories
identifiable under each. Each is limited in different ways as a window into Chinese perceptions, even
as it contributes something unique. In assessing Chinese policy or Beijing’s official position,
authoritative sources are vastly more important than other sources, but in understanding larger
patterns of perception—the subject of this report—less official sources can be equally (and in some
cases more) important.
Leadership statements are often designed for instrumental domestic purposes. For example, Xi
Jinping’s critiques of the PLA, while accurately identifying problems, may offer a one-sided view
largely designed to browbeat the military into accepting structural reforms. There is no guarantee that
they reflect the full range of his personal thoughts on the balance of power. Moreover, most official
sources (including leadership statements, institutionally-published reports, and, to a lesser extent,
articles in military journals) tend to foreswear direct comparisons to U.S. capabilities. Although they
may assess Chinese developments against more abstract standards (such as the capabilities of
“leading states”), they rarely reference particular scenarios or provide context.
Academic work, especially by civilian authors, can be more explicit, as can media reporting.
Needless to say, the categories are not entirely distinct, and some of the more revealing pieces
involve media interviews with military or other expert commentators. Probably the best a foreign
analyst can hope for is to create a crude mosaic from a variety of sources, while noting that different
actors within China will see the picture somewhat differently, depending on the vantage point from
which it is viewed, the preconceptions and training of the observer, and the filters placed on access to
different pieces of it.

Chinese Analytic Methods
In addition to considering the authors of and outlets for balance assessments, we might also consider
the methods employed. Much of the commentary on the balance of power—and the overwhelming
majority of media reports—appears based on qualitative judgments. There are, however, a few
categories of analysis that merit special note. Western scholars may not have access to some of this
material, but even in those cases it is useful to consider the methodologies available in China—and
how they have evolved—as they may shed light on the accuracy of Chinese assessments and the
confidence Chinese leaders might place in them.
Military Net Assessment
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) does not appear to have a unique or historically well-developed
approach to assessing the “correlation of military forces,” a concept that the Soviets employed at the
theater and operational levels. In recent years, however, Western net assessments, especially those by
the U.S. Office of Net Assessment and think tanks like the RAND Corporation, have drawn
significant attention in China. These are often translated and studied and referenced by Chinese
military and civilian academics, and they have prompted Chinese efforts to develop similar studies—
though not a uniform or regular set of algorithms such as those employed by the Soviets.2

2

When it was published in 2000, Dire Strait? Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Confrontation and Options of U.S.
Policy by David A. Shlapak et al. (RAND) prompted considerable Chinese interest and a suggestion that the Academy of
Military Sciences and RAND should conduct a joint follow-on study. A 500+ page unauthorized translation of RAND’s
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Comprehensive National Power Assessments
The concept of comprehensive national power (CNP) and the metrics to measure it were initially
developed at the behest of Deng Xiaoping and remain common in the Chinese literature. CNP goes
beyond military variables to include, at a minimum, measures of economic power. Unlike many
Western academic efforts to compare national power, most Chinese formulas include qualitative
variables, such as diplomatic power, while a handful (e.g., those by the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences) also include values designed to represent government capacity and social welfare. 3
Operations Research Analysis
Centered largely on the Chinese Academy of Military Science, Operations Research (OR) analysis
received a boost during the Great Leap Forward and, unlike other academic disciplines, survived the
Cultural Revolution relatively intact. In 1979, an “Operational OR Analysis Office” (作战运筹分析
研究室) was established within the Chinese Academy of Military Science, and in 1986 it was
expanded and renamed the “Military OR Analysis Research Institute.”4
A wide range of military OR work is conducted in China today, and much of it is published openly in
technical journals. Most OR assessments provide algorithms for optimizing tactical operations,
though some OR research provides data relevant to larger operational capabilities.5 Ian Easton has
summarized some of the Chinese work on airbase attacks, suggesting that Chinese analysts have
reached several broad conclusions. While ballistic missiles offer the most reliable and effective
means of striking airbases, limits on their numbers would constrain the scope of a missile campaign. 6
Although the analysis and the sources used are several years old and in need of updating, Easton
demonstrated the value of mining the Chinese OR literature.
Wargaming
Wargames are not new to China, but the PLA was slow to embrace structured, rule-based gaming
that derives historically from the Prussian games of the 19th century.7 Following disparate and largely
unsuccessful efforts to introduce computerized wargaming into various parts of the PLA during the
1980s and 1990s, the effort was centralized under the Chinese National Defense University (NDU) in
1997, and an expanded “NDU Wargaming Development Team” (国防大学兵棋研发团队) was
U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power (2015) was published by the
Knowfar Institute for Strategic and Defense Studies (知远战略与防务研究所).
3
See Wuttikorn Chuwattananurak, “China’s Comprehensive National Power and Its Implications for the Rise of China:
Reassessment and Challenges,” ISA Conference Paper, June 23, 2016.
胡晓东, 袁亚湘, 章祥荪 [Hu Xiaodong, Yuan Yaxiang, Zhang Xiangsun], 运筹学发展的回顾与发展 [“Review and
Prospects for the Development of Operations Research”], 中国科学院院刊 [China Academy of Sciences Bulletin], vol. 27,
no. 2 (2012), pp. 145-160.
5
For a few of the topics covered and the journals in which they are published, see, for example, 韩辉，张顺健 [Han Hui
and Zhang Shunjian], 预警机协同潜艇封锁作战建模与仿真 [“Airborne Warning Aircraft Collaborative Submarine
Blockade Combat Modeling and Simulation”], 计算机仿真 [Computer Simulation], vol. 29, no. 1 (January 2012); 沈培志，
聂奇刚，张邦钰 [Shen Peizhi, Nie Qigang, and Zhang Bangyu], 海上封锁作战效能评估研究 (“Effectiveness
Evaluation of Sea Blockade Operations”), 舰船电子工程 (Ship Electronic Engineering), vol. 35, no. 9 (September 2015);
陶贵明，陈彬，曾兴志，王伟 [Tao Guiming, Chen Bin, Zeng Xingzhi, and Wang Wei], 地地导弹打击机场排序模型
[“Ordering Model of Ground-to-Ground Guided Missile Attacks on Airdromes”], 电脑与信息技术 [Computer and
Information Technology], (February 2013).
6
Ian Easton, Able Archers: Taiwan Defense Strategy in an Age of Precision Strike, Project 2049, September 2014, pp. 1114.
7
As one Chinese observer notes, “wargame simulations register only thinly in our consciousness.” 刘源 [Dui Yuan], 兵棋
与兵棋推演 (Wargames and Wargame Simulations), (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2013), p. 1.
4
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established in 2007.8 An integrated game was launched in 2010, with an 11-day game played by 500
participants at the NDU, followed the next year by a game played in the Jinan Military Region, the
first outing with an operational element.
A number of games are now in use within the PLA. According to Hu Xiaofeng, such games have
several purposes, including training commanders and staff, fostering the capability of headquarters to
make sound decisions quickly, and improving operational planning.9 Although Chinese sources do
not indicate wargames are used to assess the military balance, their widespread employment almost
certainly provides a more systematic baseline understanding of relative capabilities in particular
scenarios. The extent to which that understanding is correct or skewed will, of course, depend on the
evaluation of unit quality and the algorithms embedded in the software.
Different Strokes for Different Folks
Different groups within China have access to different types of source and methods and may,
therefore, have different views of the balance. The general population is likely to rely primarily on
media reporting and may therefore have the least nuanced, most inflated view of Chinese capabilities.
Some academics will have exposure to the Chinese military system, as well as Western analyses, and
may therefore have a relatively balanced view. Military analysts and military leaders will have
exposure to different sorts of material. First-hand experience with exercises in particular will provide
a good sense of Chinese operational capabilities—though not necessarily how they compare to those
of the United States or other countries. Finally, political leaders have the authority to see or sponsor
the widest range of assessments, but their actual exposure will depend on their inclination to use such
authority.

China’s Overall Assessment of the Military Balance
Despite differences in perspective within China, the center of gravity in assessments seems to cluster
around three major points. First, China has made striking relative gains vis-à-vis the United States
and regional states, both in terms of comprehensive national power and, to a somewhat lesser extent,
in military power. Second, the United States maintains a very significant lead in overall capabilities,
and there is some uncertainty about future prospects. And third, geography matters. China may enjoy
a degree of military advantage out to the first island chain and its ability to project power beyond that
is increasing, though the United States may have a trump card in its ability to fall back and
counterattack.
Relative Gains
While noting a variety of new challenges in the international environment, Chinese analyses see
overall relative gains for comprehensive national power, primarily due to economic success. China’s
2019 defense white paper, for example, states, “China continues to enjoy political stability, ethnic
unity, and social stability. Its comprehensive national power, international influence, and ability to
withstand risk have all notably increased.” More broadly, with China leading the way “the
configuration of strategic power is becoming more balanced,” an idea that accords with other
statements heralding the trend towards multipolarity and “democracy” in international affairs. 10
国防大学兵棋团队科研攻关：编写上千万行代码 [“NDU Wargaming Team Research Program: Compiling Ten
Million Lines of Code”], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], June 30, 2014.
8

胡晓峰 [Hu Xiaofeng]，兵棋演习系统总师胡晓峰：作战规划需“快变”，科学运筹第一位 [“Wargame Training
System Master Hu Xiaofeng: Operational Planning Requires Quick Changes, Putting Scientific Planning First”]， 中国指
挥与控制学会 [China Institute of Command and Control], (January 5, 2018), reprinted by Sohu,
https://www.sohu.com/a/214892405_819742.
10
State Council Information Office, “China’s National Defense in the New Era,” July 24, 2019.
9
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These trends, and China’s view of them, are not new. The 2013 Science of Military Strategy
observes, “In keeping with the continuous increase in our nation’s comprehensive national power, the
possibility of large scale invasion, particularly ground invasion, has lessened.”11
Chinese sources evince general satisfaction with the overall development of the country’s military
and naval power. The 2019 defense white paper asserts, “Great progress has been made in the
Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese characteristics.” “In line with the strategic requirements
of near seas defense and far seas protection,” it says, “the PLA Navy is speeding up the transition of
its tasks from defense on the near seas to protection missions on the far seas, and improving its
capabilities for strategic deterrence and counterattack, maritime maneuver operations, maritime joint
operations, comprehensive defense, and integrated support, so as to build a strong and modernized
naval force.”12
This general impression of progress is broadly held and conveyed in the media. In a 2016 CCTV
interview, a serving ship captain who had been sent overseas to study warship design during the
1990s said that, at that time, “our ships could not sail far, see far, or strike far.” “Frankly speaking,”
he said, “we were a little embarrassed.” Today, however, he asserted that he felt “proud and
confident,” and noted that average days at sea have doubled in recent years.13 Many media accounts,
some of which cite foreign sources, report that China has “eroded” (侵蚀) the U.S. military
advantage.14
Significant Gap in Overall Capabilities
Despite relative gains, Chinese leaders and analysts emphasize that the U.S. retains a significant lead
not just in deployed military capabilities, but also in relevant technological areas. Moreover, there is
some uncertainty as to whether U.S. technological prowess might be mobilized to slow Chinese gains
in the future.
In his report to the 19th CPC National Congress in October 2017, Xi Jinping outlined three targets for
PLA development. By 2020, mechanization will be basically achieved, IT application will have come
a long way, and strategic capabilities will see a major improvement. By 2035, PLA modernization
will be basically complete. And by the mid-21st century, the PLA will have been transformed into a
world-class force.15 According to one senior army commander, world-class militaries have four
characteristics, i.e., the ability to 1) quickly move to any part of the world and decisively influence
events, 2) win a major war and protect national interests, 3) quickly deal with non-traditional threats
and mitigate risks and threats, and 4) improve and innovate.16

寿晓松 [Shou Xiaosong], ed., 战略学 [Science of Military Strategy], 3rd ed., (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013), p.
106.
12
“China’s National Defense in the New Era.”
13
“Transformation of Chinese Navy: Captains See Rise Towards World-Class Force,” CCTV, October 7, 2016,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-_J_YlJKbZ8&lc=z13tgt5zcx2psrt5304chpoi3wjus5oghi4.1476473627466080.
14
See, for example, 外媒：美军优势被中国侵蚀， 卷入战争可能性增大 [“Foreign Media: U.S. Military Advantage
Being Eroded by China, Probability of Being Drawn Into War Increasing”], 环球时报 [Global Times], July 2, 2015; 美国
空军杂志：美国如何在本世纪 20 年代保持空中优势 [“U.S. Air Force Magazine: How will the United States will
Maintain Air Superiority in the 2020s”], 中国航空新闻网 [China Aerospace News Network], September 10, 2019.
15
Ibid.
16
曹益民 [Cao Yimin]， 建设世界一流军队是划时代的战略要求 [“Building a World-Class Armed Force Is an EpochMaking Strategic Requirement”], 中国军事科学 [China Military Science], no. 4 (2016), p. 12. At the time of publication,
Cao was a major general and army chief of staff for the Western Theater Command.
11
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Regardless of how a world-class military is defined, Chinese accounts all agree that the U.S. is the
reigning example. The fact that Xi Jinping’s target for this status is set sometime around 2050
indicates clearly that he considers PLA capabilities as significantly inferior to those of the U.S.
military. His roadmap for how the PLA can achieve “world class” status indicates specific areas of
weakness. While acknowledging satisfaction with structural reforms taken to date, he also indicated
that much remains to be done in “continuing to deepen national defense and military reform.” Much
work is required, he said, to improve the career officer system, promote technological innovation,
and reform military training. More broadly, Xi called for practical measures to improve “combat
capability” and suggested that the ability to conduct joint operations “based on the network
information system” and the “ability to fight under multi-dimensional conditions” is critical.17
Although the U.S. military is a yardstick against which China’s military measures progress, it does
not appear that the quest to create a “world-class” military force necessarily equates with overtaking
the United States in aggregate capabilities. As PLAN Senior Colonel Zhang Junshe cautions,
“‘World-class’ is a relative term, and it is not synonymous with ‘world’s best.’” The scale and nature
of the navy would, according to Zhang, be appropriate to near seas defense and far seas protection—
a point echoed by others.18 It is more accurate to say that China wishes to have a military that is in
the same class with that of the United States and that its aspirations have more to do with the quality
of the force than they do with scale or aggregate capability, though given expected growth in the
Chinese economy, there is no reason to believe such scale would be beyond its potential.
Moreover, although there is consensus on the relative direction of change in the balance of power
over the last two decades, there is some uncertainty about the future. Emerging technologies and a
sharper U.S. focus on competition with China have introduced new elements of uncertainty. Given
the potential for new technologies to upset the balance of power by enabling rising powers to
leapfrog ahead of existing ones, it is perhaps surprising that some Chinese analyses suggest that
emerging technologies may, on the whole, work in America’s favor. The 2019 white paper notes that
“China’s military security is confronted by risks from technology surprise and a growing
technological generation gap,” a significant problem for a military force that “still lags far behind the
world’s leading militaries.”19
Wang Mingliang, a researcher at the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) Command College, writes, “In the
next 30 years, the world military field will simultaneously and alternately launch a new-quality
information revolution and a new-quality mechanized revolution…. The United States will continue
to maintain its leading position. It will be the first to introduce next-generation aerospace weapons
marked by battlefield intelligence networks, system clusters, hypersonic weapons, and new-concept
weapons. Its overall strength will remain first in the world.”20 As noted in the penultimate section of
this report, assessments of the technological balance vary, with some holding more optimistic views,
and most Chinese analysts believe that the PLA will continue to narrow the gap with the United
States, although the speed with which this occurs might slow.
Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the
Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” speech Delivered at the 19 th National People’s
Congress of the Communist Party of China” [Full Text], chinamil.com.cn, October 18, 2017.
18
建设世界一流中国海军的五重担当 [“The Five Major Tasks of Building a World-Class Chinese Navy”], 中国新闻网
[China News Net], April 18, 2019. Zhang Junshe (张军社) is a researcher at the Naval Research Institute (海军军事学术
研究所).
19
China’s National Defense in the New Era.”
20
王明亮 [Wang Mingliang], 加快建设世界一流战略空军 [“Accelerate the Building of a World-Class Strategic Air
Force”], 空军报 [Air Force Times], February 5, 2018, p. 4.
17
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Geography and Military Dynamics
The fact that Chinese analysts regard the United States as having a significant lead in overall
capabilities does not imply that they see no current options for the PLA. Militaries do not battle in a
vacuum; operational factors such as missions, geography, available time, and political circumstances
weigh heavily on outcomes. Chinese analysts note that relative gains have translated into advantages
in areas immediately surrounding China, even if the prospects are far dimmer in more distant ones.
In an article advocating for more U.S.-China confidence building measures, Nanjing University’s
Zhu Feng argues that overall “the United States is still the dominant sea and air power in the AsiaPacific region,” but that in coastal waters, the PLA has “significant ‘anti-access/area denial’ combat
capabilities” and might be able to present a more potent challenge to the United States.21 Hu Bo, of
Beijing University, similarly notes that although “the U.S. military will continue to enjoy hegemony
in maritime domains outside of the first island chain” over the next ten to twenty years, China will
“gain the advantage within the first island chain and in nearby waters.”22
Others, more optimistic about Chinese capabilities, see the timeline differently. Du Wenlong of the
Chinese Academy of Military Science and frequent television commentator claims that with the rapid
development of the Chinese Air Force, Navy, and Rocket Forces, the first island chain can no longer
limit Chinese military activities. Instead, the island chain will now limit the activities of the United
States and other powers by “blocking them outside.”23 In a similar vein, a PLA Daily article on naval
training states that the first and second island chains should not be a “chain” that binds the PLAN’s
development, but rather should be a “beacon” (航标) for its navigation to the oceans.24 A civilian
pundit, however, cautions that just because the United States has withdrawn a portion of its forces
behind the first island chain and “China can regularly transit the first island chain during peacetime,
does not imply during wartime it could prevent [the United States] from crossing the first island
chain.”25
Perhaps the most interesting recent development in the discussion of how the Chinese military might
fare, and one that is closely connected to the spatial element, is that analyses have become more
dynamic. Having gained greater confidence in the ability of Chinese forces to transit the first island
chain, some analysts now consider the responses of the U.S. and its allies and the dynamics that
might ensue—rather than looking at the problem in binary or static terms. U.S. forces operating from
deeper in the Pacific or Philippine Sea now factor significantly in Chinese assessments.
A researcher with the PLA Naval Military Studies Research Institute said that the United States “is
looking to use its base in northern Australia as a "bridgehead" to provide support for its military
operations in the South China Sea. In doing so, it is trying to “strengthen its forces on the second
朱锋 [Zhu Feng], 2018 年南海大国博弈新动向 [“2018, New Trends in the Major Power Game in the South China
Sea”], 世界知识 [World Affairs], (December 16, 2018), p. 49.
21

胡波 [Hu Bo], 中美在西太平洋的军事竞争与战略平衡 [“Military competition and strategic balance between the
China and the United States in the Western Pacific”], 世界经济与政治 [World Economics and Politics], (May 2014), p.
64.
23
“Chinese Military ‘Island Encirclement’ Training Around Taiwan,” 今日关注 [Focus Today], CCTV-4, April 28, 2018.
22

远海大洋，见证大国海军拔节成长 [“Distant Seas and Oceans, Witnessing the Blossoming of a Major Power Navy”],
解放军报 [PLA Daily], June 22, 2017.
24

科罗廖夫 [Keluoliaofu]， 已从突破岛链转为控制岛链 [“From Breaching the Island Chain to Controlling the Island
China”], http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/jssd/2017-05-02/doc-ifyetwtf9576062.shtml, May 2, 2017. Keluoliaofu (Korolev, a
Soviet rocket engineer) is the pen name of 高岩 [Gao Yan], a Chinese defense author and blogger.
25
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island chain” to counter China’s moves past the first island chain.26 Another takes note of new U.S.
operational concepts, including the use of temporary austere bases and air mobility, and cautions that
the United States is not withdrawing from the first island chain; it is, rather, “withdrawing a portion
of its forces to the second island chain and is in fact withdrawing to attack.”27 For some, commentary
on dynamics beyond the first island chain is cautionary—penetrating the first island chain is only the
first part of the problem. Others suggest that China has answers to at least some of these problems.
An assessment of offshore defenses in the Chinese periodical Aerospace Knowledge (航空知识)
envisions Chinese bombers flying from the mainland being met and escorted by fighters flying from
bases deep in the South China Sea and Chinese carriers being used to provide a mobile element
capable of plugging gaps that might emerge in China’s island-based defenses there.28 In a 2016
interview, Rear Admiral (retired) Yin Zhuo argued, “if Japan and Australia allow US fighters to take
off from their territory for attacks on China, China will automatically view them as combatant
countries and launch retaliation against them.”29 Especially in the case of Rear Admiral Zhuo’s
remarks, it may be difficult to distinguish belief, analysis, and deterrent messaging. Whether
comments are sincere or instrumental, long-range missiles and submarines (touched on below in the
discussion of weapons) factor prominently in the solutions touted.

Specific Areas of Relative Strength and Weakness
Beyond the general assessment of relative gains, how do Chinese analysts assess particular areas of
strength and weakness? Most agree that the military is making rapid progress across the board, but
that it has progressed farthest in the area of equipment modernization and has farther to go in the
areas of training and organizational adjustment (especially jointness).
Equipment
Given the emerging Chinese appreciation for a “system of systems” approach to warfare, analysts
understand that each system does not have to prevail in a head-to-head match-up with American
counterparts in order to succeed at the operational level.30 Chinese analysts see major progress in
modernizing equipment, and media reports often hail the capabilities of individual systems, but
leadership assessments appear less sanguine. In 2016, Rear Admiral Du Benyin, deputy commissar
of the PLAN’s South Sea Fleet, wrote, “Despite the fact that the Navy’s strength, weapons and
equipment continue to improve, we have weaknesses at the technological level. Our researchers have
made breakthroughs in many fields, and what we need now is the government’s determination and
investment, otherwise [sic] the Navy will lag behind others.”31
Ballistic and, to a lesser extent, cruise missiles are seen as a particular area of Chinese strength, one
that at least partly compensates for continuing shortfalls in air force capability. Chinese OR
assessments of missile operations suggest that missiles could severely challenge adversary
advantages in other domains, particularly air warfare, even if the missile inventory is not sufficient to
win a campaign alone. Reporting on recent developments, particularly on newer missiles, highlights
Comments by 曹卫东 [Cao Weidong], 今日关注 [Focus Today], CCTV-4, December 28, 2018.
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technological breakthroughs that maintain or advance Chinese relative capability despite
countermeasures by the United States. The DF-26’s ability to launch from unprepared positions, for
example, would complicate the task of targeting these missiles prior to launch, and the ability of
warheads to maneuver during flight provides them with penetration capability despite improvements
to the missile defenses of the U.S. and its regional allies.32
Chinese analysts also evince great satisfaction with the strides made in capabilities related to air-toair combat (e.g., fighter aircraft, air-to-air missiles, and UAVs), but it appears most serious analysts
do not think PLAAF and PLANAF equipment have caught up to U.S. standards.33 While military
commentators on CCTV hail the J-20, for example, as superior to both the F-22 and F-35, specialist
journals are more forthcoming about weaknesses.34 U.S. military and expert opinion, which is
distinctly less kind to the J-20, is also reported in detail in the Chinese print media, and Chinese blog
posts echo U.S. opinion by observing various weaknesses in the J-20.35 More to the point, some
emphasize that head-to-head comparisons do not capture the dynamics of warfare, and that the J-20
brings important capabilities to China’s overall toolkit, even if it cannot match the F-22.36
Chinese reporting on surface warship design is more upbeat. Discussions of the Luyang III class
destroyer (Type 052D) and Renhai class cruiser (Type 055) depict these vessels as fully modern
warships. The Type 055 is significantly larger than U.S. Arleigh Burke destroyers and is equipped
with powerful domestically-produced gas turbine engines, more (and larger) VLS cells than the
Arleigh Burke, and active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. The Type 346B radar, which
combines X-band and S/C-band, is a particular point of pride, as Chinese analysts observe that China
effectively beat the United States to the deployment of AESA radar on ships and will have more
ships equipped with such radar until the U.S. completes its retrofit of the Flight IIA ships—though it
remains to be seen how the radar’s effectiveness compares to that of the new U.S. SPY-6. 37
Chinese assessments of submarine and ASW capabilities are more mixed. In June 2018, Xi Jinping
inspected a Type 093B (improved Shang-class) submarine and pronounced that nuclear submarines
are a “nation’s ultimate instrument” and China’s nuclear submarines “should be greatly improved.”38
Chinese media reported U.S. assessments of the Shang-class SSNs as having acoustic properties
roughly in line with Los Angeles-class attack submarines built during the 1970s to 1990s, but inferior
to those of the newer Virginia-class.39 Reporting on the most recent diesel designs (especially the
我们为什么要发展东风-26 弹道导弹 [“Why We Needed to Develop the DF-26 Ballistic Missile”], 中国青年报
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33
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Type 039) is more positive, but as the potential battlespace has expanded, some analysts have noted
the urgency of developing more advanced nuclear-powered attack submarines.40
Training
U.S. operations during the Kosovo War and the Gulf War came as a shock to PLA leaders not only
because of the awesome potential of precision strike, but also because it exposed a large gap in
training between the PLA and U.S. forces.41 The Chinese appreciation of quality U.S. military
training has carried over into analyses of more recent conflicts. In an assessment of foreign training
methods, Major General Hua Zhongliang writes, “in recent limited wars, the U.S. military has paid a
relatively low price in casualties while fighting and winning successive battles. Apart from its
advantage in weaponry, an extremely important factor has been the high standards of its peacetime
training. The U.S. training motto is ‘train as we fight, and fight as we train.’”42
These lessons (and much of the phrasing) have carried over directly into the PLA’s effort to train
under “actual combat conditions” (实战条件)—i.e., conditions that most closely approximate a
conflict with the world’s most advanced militaries. Although Chinese military leaders and analysts
see major progress in the area of training, they insist that Chinese training still lags. Employing the
euphemistic “world-class” to compare Chinese practice to that of other advanced states (particularly
the U.S. military), Yang Xiyu, senior fellow at the China Institute of International Studies, expressed
a common view when he said that although “we are not at world-class in terms of hardware yet, the
gap in the software [human resources and development] is even bigger.”43
Borrowing a page from Deng Xiaoping and Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping has leveled harsh criticisms of the
military, presumably in large part to bring the PLA into line and compel it to accept military reforms,
a task that has also been greatly facilitated by Xi’s anti-corruption drive and the arrest of many top
generals. In 2014, Xi derided the PLA’s “two insufficiencies” (两个能力不够), suggesting that its
modernization was insufficient to fight a modern war and that the cadre at each level had insufficient
capability to command a major war.44 This was later expanded into the “five incapables” (五个不会),
which notes that some officers cannot judge situations, understand higher authorities’ intentions,
make operational decisions, deploy troops, or deal with unexpected situations. A central cause of
these problems is, it is said, a lack of commitment to realistic training under actual combat
conditions.45
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There is some disconnect between these leadership criticisms and descriptions of training activities.
In the latter, we see that the operational tempo, scale, and frequency of PLA and PLAN training
activities have increased dramatically. A 2017 PLA Daily article noted that PLAN was exercising
more, in more distant seas, and with greater realism than ever before. Whereas destroyers that retired
in 2016 spent an annual average of 30 days at sea, traveling an average of 6,000 nm over that period,
China’s newest destroyers average more than 200 days at sea, logging 30,000 nm. Anti-submarine
warfare exercises are conducted over vast areas and bring together various elements of the navy.46
Bloggers and the popular media have celebrated these achievements, noting that time at sea for the
newest PLAN warships exceed that of the U.S. Navy.47
The quality of training has also evolved. During unscripted exercises, which have been introduced to
the PLA over the last two decades, “the combat objectives of the two belligerent parties, their
respective operational plans, their use of the electromagnetic frequency resources, and other specific
details of the drill are not determined,” but instead left up to the commanders.48 A February 2018
report on a large naval exercise conducted by the Southern Theater Command tells us that
“unexpected” developments were more the norm than the exception and that the “red” (Chinese)
force lost its ISR aircraft early in the battle when it approached too close to “blue” ships.49
At the same time, some of these sources also note the difficulty of adjusting practice, especially when
doing so impinges on established patterns of authority between superior and junior officers. PLAAF
sources record the experience of commanders on the ground overriding the decisions of flight
commanders and reassuming “control” of the battle at the moment of contact—and of inexperienced
flight leads ceding control at equally critical moments.50 Even ostensible instances of PLA triumph
can be revealing. A June 2018 article in the People’s Navy describes a fleet exercise in which
submarine commanders were given a relatively free hand in their activities. The article noted that it
had been common in past exercises for higher commands to send a staff “escort” aboard submarines
during past exercises. This practice was abandoned despite trepidation about who would assume
responsibility in case of failure. Noting the unrealistic nature of past practice, the article asked, “If
war were to break out, where were all those higher level commanders and staffers going to come
from to 'escort' every sub?"51
Jointness
Under Xi, perhaps no other military issue has received greater attention than jointness. The seven
military regions have been replaced with five theater commands, each of which is a joint command
capable of coordinating the activities of ground, naval, air, and rocket forces. According to PLA
“Distant Seas and Oceans, Witnessing the Blossoming of a Major Power Navy.”
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Army researcher Zhang Xicheng, “There can be no battle without jointness, and without jointness
there can be no victory.” PLA commentators have looked to historical and foreign examples to
highlight both the importance and means of improving jointness. Zhang Xicheng, for example,
highlights poor jointness for the failure of Argentine forces to defeat the British in the Falklands War,
despite “extreme geographical advantage.”52 The U.S. military is the most frequent point of
comparison and is, at least in the post-Goldwater-Nichols era, viewed as the gold standard.53
Shortcomings in Chinese jointness are a central theme in Xi’s critique of the PLA.
Chinese commentators acknowledge that “by comparison with foreign militaries, joint operations in
our military started later, and the joint operations command system is still being introduced and
adapted.”54 Moreover, these analysts recognize that jointness requires a culture shift, and that is
resisted in some quarters of the PLA.55 The PLA has introduced a “triad” of military educational
reforms (at academies, operational units, and military professional education) to foster jointness. It
has created on-the-job training for joint personnel and a certification program for them at the theater
commands, and preparations are being made for a virtual joint command college with online courses.
But in a September 2018 speech, Xi Jinping noted that military professional education reform
remained in the initial exploratory stage and that traditional mindsets persist.56 Chinese military
journals and newspapers are filled with uplifting stories of progress in jointness, but it is not clear
how a fundamental culture shift can occur without the sort of structural incentives introduced under
Goldwater-Nichols.
In the event of a crisis or impending war, questions about training, competence, and human resources
would compound uncertainties posed by the U.S. presence on China’s sea lines of communication
and the possibility of technological surprise. These considerations temper China’s sense of
satisfaction with the modernization of the PLA over the last several decades. How does China view
potential changes to the balance of power under conditions of intensified competition with the U.S.?

The Impact of Intensified Military Competition with the United States
Chinese analysts have written extensively on various U.S. policies, concepts, or ideas designed, in
part or in whole, to slow or reverse eroding U.S. superiority in the Pacific. These include the “pivot”
to Asia, the Indo-Pacific strategy, efforts to spur military transformation, Air-Sea Battle and other
new operational concepts, the Third Offset Strategy and other cost imposing strategies, the notion of
great power competition, and increased U.S. military spending under the Trump Administration.
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Most Chinese sources acknowledge that increased competition and a sharper U.S. military focus on
China will complicate the PLA’s efforts to narrow the gap. “Without a doubt,” a senior analyst at a
government think tank writes, the Third Offset Strategy and other U.S. cost imposing strategies “will
place pressure on China … and challenge China’s peaceful rise and regeneration.”57 An academic at
the Chinese Academy of Military Science similarly writes that the Third Offset Strategy may “help
the United States sustain, and in some areas expand, its technological superiority. It may well deter
potential adversaries from challenging the United States.”58
At the same time, most analysts see the probable impact as marginal—assuming China does not
overreact to the challenge. Implementing efforts to transform the U.S. military will be hindered by
bureaucratic and budgetary factors, and China, which spends only 1.5 or 2 percent of GDP on the
military, is unlikely to fall prey to economically damaging competition in the same way the former
Soviet Union did.59 Overall, most Chinese analysts appear to believe the United States continues to
hold a technological lead, though some disagree.60
Chinese analysts make similar points about increased budgets, deployments to Asia, and military
diplomacy. Again, these are viewed as new challenges to China, but not ones that are likely to be
insurmountable. One report notes that the U.S. Navy’s increased operational tempo has resulted in
lower readiness rates and more accidents, despite budget increases.61 And China’s diplomacy has
mitigated the impact of U.S. efforts to tighten alliances and develop new military partnerships in
Southeast Asia and elsewhere.62 The overall tenor of reporting on the future, especially technologyrelated issues, is one of greater uncertainty but still tempered optimism.
One area of particular concern involves developments that impinge on China’s nuclear security. For
decades, Chinese strategists have debated whether U.S. missile defenses jeopardized its retaliatory
capability and, if so, how to respond.63 Despite the growth and qualitative improvement of China’s
nuclear forces, calculations of sufficiency have been complicated by the evolution of cyber, precision
strike, and ISR capabilities—the Second Offset—as well as the deployment of additional missile
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defenses.64 Most recently, U.S. adjustments to strategic thought and nuclear and space policy under
the National Security Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review (2018) have prompted another round of
discussion about the nuclear balance and whether adjustments will be necessary on the Chinese side.
Here, too, initial conclusion appears to be that overreaction—and the type of arms racing that would
consume a larger proportion of national wealth—would be counterproductive to Chinese security.65
Nevertheless, whereas China may be able to tolerate a degree of uncertainty about the possibility of
temporary reversals in the conventional balance at some distance off its coast, it is likely to be more
conservative in maintaining a “lean and effective” retaliatory capability.66 At the same time,
however, both the strategic and theater and nuclear and conventional are becoming interconnected in
ways that may challenge China’s ability to not respond to specific conventional challenges that might
affect perceived nuclear security.67

Conclusion
It is perhaps an inevitable feature of our increasingly connected world that there should be less
mystery surrounding Chinese assessment of the balance of power than there was to be found in the
alternate world of Soviet “correlation of forces.” To be sure, our picture of Chinese perceptions is far
from perfect, and we would want a much better understanding of Chinese wargaming, as well as
PLA reporting more generally, before drawing conclusions with great confidence. Nevertheless, the
cross-fertilization of Chinese and U.S. sources provides a degree of overlap in understanding that has
sometimes been missing in historical rivalries.
Overall, there is consensus in China that the PLA has narrowed the gap in overall military
capabilities with the United States over the last two decades. There is also general agreement, at least
within the expert community if not always the popular media, that Chinese capabilities continue to
lag those of the United States by an extent that may surprise some U.S. strategists. Chinese analysts
believe that Chinese capabilities may nevertheless enjoy a degree of superiority—or at least be able
64
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to contest U.S. supremacy—in scenarios close to home, particularly within or just beyond the first
island chain. There is somewhat less agreement on the extent to which China continues to lag in
militarily relevant technology and the degree to which the U.S. might slow or reverse change in the
balance of power through its efforts to compete more directly and vigorously with China. And
although some voices call for responses in kind, most authoritative sources urge China to stay the
course and avoid engaging in an open and resource-consuming arms race.
Overall, there is probably some bias towards an exaggeration of China’s capability within its
assessment system, though there appears to be great variation in terms of bias between types of
analysis (and some types of sources are probably biased in the opposite direction), and the degree of
overall exaggeration is likely relatively modest. Chinese political leaders have followed a relentlessly
forthright approach to acknowledging problems and seeking solutions since at least the era of reform
and opening, and it is unlikely that modest biases in military assessment would lead to major
miscalculation at the political level. This hopeful conclusion, however, comes with major caveats, the
most important of which is that severe international crises may elevate the perceived risks of
compromise or inaction. Hence, even if leaders calculate that the probability of success in bold or
dramatic action may be low or modest, the appeal of such a course will rise if the alternatives are
perceived as being even worse.
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